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Consensus, Conflict, or
Compromise? State-Church
Relations in the Swedish “People’s
Home” During the 1920s and 1930s
5Ingela K. Q1Naumann
What does religion have to do with the Swedish welfare state?
“Nothing” has been the established view among social scientists.
“Everything” has been the response by some scholars in recent
10years. Social scientists maintain that the Swedish welfare state is, in
essence, a Social Democratic welfare state, its comprehensive and
generous welfare provision mirroring the principles and politics of
Social Democracy, which was long the dominant political force in
modern Sweden.1 If concerned with religion at all, researchers have
15pointed to theabsenceof religiouscleavages inSwedishpartypolitics
and thus their irrelevance for welfare state development.2 According
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1. See, e.g.,GøstaEsping-Andersen,TheThreeWorldsofWelfareCapitalism (Cam-
bridge: Polity Press, 1990).
2. John D. Stephens, “Religion and Politics in Three Northwest European Democ-
racies,” Comparative Social Research 2 (1979): 129-57; Lars Bo Kaspersen and
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to this account, core features of Swedish welfare—universalism, an
emphasis on equality and public social service provision—reflect
the interests and redistributive aims of the labor movement and the
20Social Democratic Party’s ability to forge class alliances.3 In the
past, historians and historically oriented social scientists have quali-
fied the “SocialDemocratic thesis,” pointing toaseries of historicand
culturalconditions for thesuccessof thiswelfarestatemodel, suchas
the strong ethnic, cultural, and religious homogeneity of the Swedish
25population.4 Recently, however, this argument has been taken even
further.
Political scientist Tim Knudsen, for example, argues that the
Lutheran Church was centrally involved in creating this homogeneity
in linguistic and religious terms.5 Further, he identifies how the his-
30toric institutional and administrative structures developed by the
Lutheran state church provided a fundamental precondition for the
universal welfare state. Particularly in the figure of the local pastor,
who tookon both secularand spiritual functions in the agrarian com-
munities, a link between state and society was created and abasis laid
35for the development of the expectation that the state should be
responsible for social welfare.6 Historian Uffe Østerga˚rd goes even
further still, maintaining that there is a strong ideological link
between the Social Democratic policy visions and Lutheranism in
Nordic countries.7 He argues that the focus on full employment and
40on social security for all, characteristic of the Nordic welfare states,
mirror two central ideas in Lutheranism: daily work as the fulfillment
of God’s vocation and a “priesthood of all believers,”8 the latter pro-
moting a culture of equality where large social differences become
Johannes Lindvall, “Why No Religious Politics? The Secularization of Poor Relief
and Primary Education in Denmark and Sweden,” Archive Europe´en Sociologique
XLIX (2008): 119-43.
3. Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds; Gøsta Esping-Andersen and Walter Korpi,
“Social Policy as Class Politics in Post-War Capitalism: Scandinavia, Austria, and
Germany,” in Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism, ed. John H.
Goldthorpe (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 179-208.
4. See, e.g., Nanna Kildal and Stein Kuhnle, ed., Normative Foundations of the
Welfare State: The Nordic Experience (Abingdon/New York: Routledge, 2005).
5. Tim Knudsen, “Tilblivelsen af den universalistiske velfaerdsstat,” in Den nor-
diskeprotestantismeogvelfaerdsstaten,ed.TimKnudsen (Aarhus:AarhusUniver-
sitetsforlag, 2000), 20-64.
6. Ibid., 41.
7. UffeØsterga˚rd, “TheGeopoliticsofNordic Identity—FromCompositeStatesto
Nation-States,” in The Cultural Construction of Norden, ed. Øystein So¨rensen and
Bo Stra˚th (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1997).
8. See also Dag Thorkildsen,” Religious Identity and Nordic Identity,” in The Cul-
tural Construction of Norden, ed. Øystein So¨rensen and Bo Stra˚th (Oslo: Scandina-
vian University Press, 1997), 138-60.
Journal of Church and State
2
unacceptable. The Nordic welfare state, according to Østerga˚rd, is de
45facto a “Lutheran welfare state” based on “secularized Lutheranism.”
Other scholars take a more moderate stance in what is now a
growing field of research into the role of religion in modern welfare
states, maintaining that Lutheranism and the Lutheran Church were
influential in the way the Swedish welfare state evolved, albeit not
50the only or perhaps most important factors.9 In many ways, this
strand of research takes inspiration from Stein Rokkans’s seminal
work on social cleavages and modern state formation.10 For
example, Sigrun Kahl points to the indirect influence of the Lutheran
ethical doctrine that led the Lutheran Church to accept the develop-
55ment of poor relief and early welfare state programs.11 In the same
vein, Manow and van Kersbergen,12 Q3while describing the absence of
religious conflict in Swedish party politics, emphasize the positive
contribution of the Lutheran Church to the development of the
Swedish welfare state by not opposing, or even welcoming, the intro-
60duction of state welfare.13 And Thomas Bahle more specifically
relates the extensive public service provision in the Swedish welfare
state to the nonconflictual and consensual nature of state-church
relations in Sweden.14
This Rokkanian perspective does not challenge the Social Demo-
65cratic thesis of the Swedish welfare state outlined above, but it
makes an important amendment: religion was not irrelevant in the
9. Thomas Bahle, Familienpolitik in Westeuropa: Urspru¨nge und Wandel im inter-
nationalen Vergleich (Frankfurt a.M./New York: Campus, 1995); Thomas Bahle,
“Public Child Care in Europe: Historical Trajectories and New Directions,” in
Child Care and Preschool Development in Europe: Institutional Perspectives, ed.
Kirsten Scheiwe and Harry Willekens (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009),
23-42; Sigrun Kahl, “The Religious Roots of Modern Poverty Policy: Catholic,
Lutheran, and Reformed Protestant Traditions Compared,” European Journal of
Sociology 45 (2005): 91-126; Kimberly Morgan, Working Mothers and the Welfare
State: Religion and the Politics of Work-Family Policies in Western Europe and The
United States (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006); Kimberly Morgan,
“Forging the Frontiers between State, Church, and Family: Religious Cleavages
and the Origins of Early Childhood Education in France, Sweden, and Germany,”
Politics and Society, 30, no. 1 (2002): 259-89. Philip Manow and Kees van Kersber-
gen, “Religion and the Western Welfare State—The Theoretical Context,” in Reli-
gion, Class Coalitions, and Welfare States, ed. Philip Manow and Kees van
Kersbergen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 1-38; Kaspersen
and Lindvall, “Why No Religious.”
10. Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan, “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems,
and Voter Alignments: An Introduction,” in Party Systems and Voter Alignments:
Cross-National Perspectives, ed. Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan (New York:
Free Press, 1967), 1-64.
11. Kahl, “The Religious Roots.”
12. Manow & van Kersbergen, “Religion and the Western Welfare States.”
13. Ibid., 4.
14. Bahle, Familienpolitik; Bahle, “Public Child Care.”
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formative phases of the welfare state in Sweden; rather, the Lutheran
Church left it to thestate, and in thatsense towhomeverwas inpower,
to develop social welfare programs. This view makes space for an
70understanding of the Swedish Lutheran Church as an active player
in key processes of modern society and allows for the contrafactual
possibility that the Church PER CHICAGO 8.106, Q4could also have
opposed or slowed down the development of social policy and thus
changed the course of welfare state history. If consensus between
75the church and the state was a condition for the type of welfare
state that developed, we then should speak not only of a “Social Dem-
ocratic class alliance”as abasis for the Swedishwelfare state, butalso
for a “state/church alliance.” Or, to spin this thought further, for a
“Social Democratic state/church alliance.” Q5
80However, would such an alliance, or consensual relationship,
between state and church in a specifically Social Democratic
welfare state not need further explanation? It is not difficult to
see how consensual relationships would be possible if there were
congruence of principles and values between the national govern-
85ment and the church, as was the case during most of post-
reformatory history up until the beginning of the twentieth
century.15 But such relations are not self-evident with a Social Dem-
ocratic government. In fact, Swedish Social Democracy was closely
linked to the social movements that opposed the “ancient
90regime,” including the Swedish Church, and harbored strong antire-
ligious and anticlerical sentiments.16 Many Lutheran clerics were
no less critical of Social Democracy and its vision of modern
society.17 Thus, strong tensions between the government and the
Lutheran Church18 could have been expected when the Social
15. HenrikStenius, “TheGoodLife isaLifeofConformity:The ImpactofLutheran
Tradition on Nordic Political Culture,” in The Cultural Construction of Norden, ed.
Øystein So¨rensen and Bo Stra˚th (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1997),
161-71.
16. Sven E. Olsson, Social Policy and the Welfare State in Sweden, 2nd enl. ed.
(Lund: Arkiv Fo¨rlag, 1993); Urban Claesson, Folkhemmets kyrka. Harald Halle´n
och folkkyrkans genombrott. En studie av socialdemokrati, kyrka och nations-
bygge med sa¨rskild ha¨nsyn till perioden 1905-1933 (Uppsala: Uppsala University,
2004); Herbert Tingsten, Den Svenska Socialdemokratiens Ideutveckling II (Stock-
holm: Tidens Fo¨rlag, 1941).
17. So¨ren Ekstro¨m, Makten o¨ver kyrkan. Om Svenska kyrkan, folket och staten
(Stockholm: Verbum, 2003); Karl J. Ho¨jer, Svensk Socialpolitisk historia (Stock-
holm: Norstedts, 1952).
18. The Lutheran Church in Sweden officially identifies itself as “Evangelical
Lutheran Church” and calls itself “Swedish Church” (svenska kyrkan). In this
article the terms “Swedish Church,” “Lutheran Church,” “state church,” and the
“Church” are used interchangeably.
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95Democratic Party (SAP)19 became a leading political force. Why,
then, was there not more open conflict? How did the SAP govern-
ment and the Lutheran Church negotiate their relationship?
It is these questions this article aims to explore by examining the
state-church relationship in Sweden during the first decades of the
100twentieth century, focusing particularly on the 1920s and 1930s as
a formative phase in Swedish welfare state history. While the main
expansion of the welfare state in Sweden fell into the postwar
period, the 1920s and 1930s were politically important for laying
the basis for the Swedish welfare state compromise: modern democ-
105racyhadbeenestablishedwith the introduction ofuniversal suffrage;
the SAP rose to power, starting a long period of political dominance in
Sweden, and developed its welfare state vision of the “people’s
home”; and the “red-green alliance” between workers and farmers
was forged, allowing for the development of comprehensive, univer-
110sal social programs.20 As this article will show, the 1920s and 1930s
were also a period in which the relationship between the state and the
Church was renegotiated, with the state-church system itself being
put into question from both sides.
This article follows in the Rokkanian research tradition of under-
115standing historical social cleavages as a basis for the national politi-
cal constellations that shaped welfare state development but aims
to amend it in two ways: first, it finds that the consensual character
of the state-church relationship in Sweden has been overstated; to
the contrary, the formative phase of welfare state development was
120a period of strong contention. Second, attention to the shifting cleav-
age structure and, in particular, to the intersection of class and reli-
gion in the formation of the political parties helps us to better
understand how the forging of strategic compromises between the
state and the Church and the development of shared national narra-
125tives became possible.
This article will first review some arguments that have been made
with respect to the role of religion in the Swedish welfare state. It
will then use a process-oriented historical approach to provide a
more detailed understanding of the state-church relationship in the
130early twentieth century. It will discuss the way class and religious
cleavages intersected at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning
of the twentieth century to create the specific political constellations
of the time, and then outline changing orientations within SAP and
the Swedish Church and how these affected the relation between
19. The Swedish Social Democratic Labor Party is, in the European context, com-
monly known as SAP —an abbreviation of its Swedish name “Sveriges Socialde-
mokratiska Arbetarparti.”
20. Bo Stra˚th, Sveriges Historia, 1830-1920 (Stockholm: Norstedts Fo¨rlag, 2012).
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135the two. Historian Bo Stra˚th has emphasized the importance of the
“folk” concept (the “people”) for the development of national identity
and a shared conception of society in Sweden during the interwar
years.21 This article will also show how the “people” concept
became an important integrative trope, creating bridges between
140the popular movements (folkro¨relser): the Social Democrat’s vision
of the welfare state as a “people’s home” Q6(folkhem) and the state
church as a reformed “people’s church” (folkkyrka), both of which
helped diffuse religious conflict in the early phase of the Swedish
welfare state.
145Implications of a State-Church System for
State-Church Relations
Most welfare state researchers believe that the relationship between
state and church in Sweden has historically been consensual and
unproblematic.22 Yet there has been little probing into why this
150would be the case. From a Rokkanian perspective this state-church
consensus is the result of religious homogeneityand thestate-church
system.23 Following the Reformation, and as decreed by the 1593
Uppsala convocation, Lutheranism became the national religion in
Sweden and the Evangelical-Lutheran Church became the Swedish
155national church; thus, by default, all subjects of the king had to be
Lutheran. It was only in 1860 that the presence of other Christian
churches was officially tolerated and conversions were permitted.24
At the beginning of the twentieth century, 99 percent of the popula-
tion was Lutheran.25 The establishment of a state-church system
21. Bo Stra˚th, “Nordic Capitalism and Democratization,” in The Democratic Chal-
lenge to Capitalism: Management and Democracy in the Nordic Countries, ed.
Haldor Byrkjeflot et al. (Oslo: Fagbokfo¨rlaget, 2001); Bo Stra˚th, “The Normative
Foundations of the Scandinavian Welfare States in Historical Perspective,” in Nor-
mative Foundations of the Welfare State: The Nordic Experience, eds. Nanna Kildal
and Stein Kuhnle (New York: Routledge, 2005), 34-51; BoStra˚th, “Der Volksbegriff
in der Organisation der Religionsausu¨bung Schwedens,” in Baupla¨ne der sichtba-
ren Kirche. Sprachliche Konzepte religio¨ser Vergemeinschaftung in Europa, ed.
Lucian Ho¨lscher (Go¨ttingen: Wallstein, 2007), 168-95.
22. Anders Ba¨ckstro¨m, Svenska kyrkan som va¨lfa¨rdsakto¨r i en global kultur. En
studie av religion och omsorg (Stockholm: Verbum, 2000); Bahle, “Public Child
Care”; Manow and van Kersbergen, “Religion and the Western Welfare State”;
andMorgan,WorkingMothers. ForadifferentversionseeStra˚th, “DerVolksbegriff
in der Organization.”
23. Lipset and Rokkan, “Cleavage Structures.”
24. Full religious freedom was, however, only established in Sweden in 1951. See
Go¨ran Gustafsson, “Church-State Separation Swedish-Style,” in West European
Politics 26 (2003): 51-72.
25. Stenius, “TheGoodLife”;PirjoMarkkola, “Introduction:TheLutheranContext
of Nordic Women’s History,” in Gender and Vocation: Women, Religion and Social
Journal of Church and State
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160created strong ties between the state and the Church: the state’s inter-
ests became also the Church’s interests, and the Swedish Church to
some extent became a state bureaucracy, taking on important
secular functions alongside religious ones.26
It has been argued that, due to its close links to the state apparatus,
165theSwedishChurchdidnotneedtoorganizecountermobilizations in
reaction to the rise of liberalism, socialism, and other protest move-
ments in the second half of the nineteenth century.27 This argument,
however, underestimates the social cleavages that opened up in this
period and the ensuing political conflicts.
170Religious revivalism became an influential social movement in
Swedish society in the nineteenth century and played an important
role in transforming a premodern agrarian society into a modern
one.28 The Swedish Church as High Church was strongly opposed to
religious revivalism, which led to a polarization between the official
175Lutheran Church and the free churches. By the early twentieth
century, the revivalist movement mobilized as many Swedes as the
labor movement, around 10 percent of the Swedish population.29
This new religious cleavage between the Lutheran Church and the
free churches also affected the political system: in 1910, 22 percent
180of parliamentarians belonged to a free church.30
Also the extent of the alleged “state/church consensus” Q7needs to be
questioned in this period. A consensus would come relatively easily
between the government and the Church when both recruited from
the same national elite and both supported the same social order,
185as was the case during most of post-reformatory history in Sweden.
However, it is a bit less obvious in a situation when, in effect, the
usurpers—those that want to overthrow the old order—take over
the house, as was the case when the Liberals and SAP came into
power in the early twentieth century.31 As we shall see, the question
Change in the Nordic Countries, 1830-1940, ed. Pirjo Markkola (Helsinki: Finnish
Literature Society, 2000), 12.
26. Gustafsson, “Church-State Separation,”; Knudsen, “Tilblivelsen.”
27. Stephens, “Religion and Politics.”
28. Thorkildsen, “Religious Identity.”
29. Erik Sidenvall, “Frikyrkligheten i Sverige 1920-1965,” in Sveriges Historia,
1920-1965, ed. Yvonne Hirdman, Urban Lundberg, and Jenny Bjo¨rkman (Stock-
holm: Norstedts, 2012), 83; Kaspersen and Lindvall, “Why No Religious,” 120.
30. Ekstro¨m, Makten o¨ver kyrkan, 137.
31. In 1911 the Liberal Party, for the first time, gained more seats in Parliament
than the Conservatives and was in government until 1914. From 1917-1920 the
Liberals and Social Democrats formed a coalition government. In 1920 SAP
became the sole governing party. The 1920s saw a rapid succession of Left and
Right governments, but from the early 1930s SAP governed almost uninterrupted
for nearly fifty years. See Go¨ran Therborn, “A Unique Chapter in the History of
Consensus, Conflict, or Compromise? Q2
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190of the role of the Church was integral to competing visions of what
modern Swedish society should look like; attempts to separate state
and church were launched from various sides, both as a means to
strengthen as well as weaken the Church’s position in society.32
Another argument for the absence of religious conflict in Sweden,
195particularly with respect to welfare state development, is that the
division of labor around social welfare had already been settled
before the expansion of the Swedish welfare state in the twentieth
century.33 In premodern agrarian Sweden, the Swedish Church was
thecentralproviderofsocialwelfareandeducationvia localparishes,
200theso-called socken.TheChurchalso tookonseveralother important
secular functions, such asthe registering of the population. Through-
out the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, agradual secularization
of communal responsibilities took place. In particular, in 1862 a
major municipal reform ended the old socken PER CHICAGO 7.55,
Q8205system, introducingadualcommunalsystemwitha local civilgovern-
ment and a parish establishing aclearer division of labor between the
local political authority and the Church. At the same time, the
Church’s role in welfare provision was reduced; in particular, poor
relief became the responsibility of the public municipality.34 It has
210been argued that the differentiation between state and church
responsibilities, separating worldly from spiritual matters, was wel-
comed by the Swedish Church in light of the Lutheran “two king-
doms” doctrine35 and took place without conflict.36
The division of labor between state and church with respect to
215social welfare was, however, not as neat as that; the Church, for
example, remained heavily involved in school education long
into the twentieth century.37 Also health services, support for
the elderly, and child care were areas where the Church and
religious organizations such as the deaconry, were active and even
220expanded their activities during the first decades of the twentieth
Democracy: The Social Democrats in Sweden,” in Creating Social Democracy: A
Century of the Social Democratic Labor Party in Sweden, ed. Klaus Misgeld et al.
(University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), 1-34.
32. Sven Thidevall, Ett folkkyrkligt reformprograms o¨den 1928-1932 (Stockholm:
Verbum, 2000); Ekstro¨m, Makten o¨ver kyrkan; Claesson, Folkhemmets kyrka.
33. Kaspersen and Lindvall, “Why No Religious.”
34. See Poor Relief Act 1871.
35. Dietz Lange, Ethik in evangelischer Perspektive: Grundfragen christlicher Leb-
enspraxis (Go¨ttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1992).
36. Kahl, “The Religious Roots.”
37. Thidevall, Ett folkkyrkligt reformprograms, 206. Municipal school boards
were headed by the parish minister, due to the importance attributed to religious
education as part of the curriculum. Kaspersen and Lindvall, “Why No Religious,”
130.
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century.38 For example, in 1940 only 7 percent of child care services
were provided by the state, with the rest being provided by private,
often religiously inspired, initiatives.39 These were also the areas
that the Social Democratic welfare aimed to expand into in the
2251930s, necessitating a renegotiation of how this social space was to
be shared between state and church.
Karen Anderson has developed a slightly different argument. While
she agrees with Kaspersen et al. and others that the Lutheran Church
supported early poor relief and administrative reforms, she main-
230tains that the Church grew increasingly hostile to the expansion of
state welfare during the latter half of the nineteenth century, becom-
ing more accepting of social change only in the early part of the twen-
tieth century. But by the time the Church regained interest in the
social question, according to Anderson, it was “too late,” as the Liber-
235als and Social Democrats had already become the main representa-
tives of social reform.40
In addition, from a historical perspective, this account raises
questions. For centuries, the Church had been one of the most
powerful institutions in Swedish society, albeit it was losing influ-
240ence in the wake of the political and social reforms in the nineteenth
century. Even so, the Church was still a political force to be reckoned
with at the beginning of the twentieth century. For instance,
Lutheran bishops were still holding important political and admin-
istrative positions.41 And from the pulpit Lutheran pastors could
245effectively reach the Swedish people and influence public opinion,
something that was increasingly important in the unfolding democ-
racy. As the following will illustrate, it is perhaps not so much a
question of lack of power, but the absence of a unified position
that would have allowed the Church to influence the course of
250social policy development more clearly. Nor had clear and full-
fledged welfare state programs been yet developed on the political
scene. The first decades of the twentieth century were a period of
searching and political maneuvers where the political parties
were first developing their broader societal visions and were
255“testing the water” with respect to their constituencies and
38. See, e.g., Markkola, “Introduction”; Annette Leis, Den kyrkliga diakonins roll
inomramenfo¨r tva˚va¨lfa¨rdssystem.En ja¨mfo¨randefallstudieav tva˚diakoniinstitu-
tioner i Sverige och Tyskland (Uppsala: Sociology of Religions, 2004); and Leis Q15.
39. Peter Antman, Barn och a¨ldreomsorg i Tyskland och Sverige. Sverigedelen
(Stockholm: Socialdepartemente, 1996).
40. Karen M. Anderson, “The Church as Nation? The Role of Religion in the Devel-
opment of the Swedish Welfare State,” in Religion, Class Coalitions, and Welfare
States, ed. PhilipManowandKeesvanKersbergen (Cambridge:CambridgeUniver-
sity Press, 2009), 213.
41. UlrikaLagerlo¨fNilsson, “TheBishops intheChurchofSweden,”Scandinavian
Journal of History 30 (2005): 308-19.
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potential alliances.42 The existing social insurances and social pol-
icies were rudimentary and in many respects still a continuation of
the poor law tradition.43 Also within the Swedish Church, a range of
theological and political responses were developed to the “social
260question” as different clerics engaged with the social and political
changes in different ways.44 While some directly opposed increased
social spending, others actively promoted the development of spe-
cific social policies.45
The three accounts presented here all assume unified political and
265social actors whose positions are clearly defined, whereas detailed
historical analysis often demonstrates that the political reality was
more complex. Interestingly they identify three different historical
periods46 for initiating institutional trajectories that, in these
accounts, determined state-church relations in Sweden. This indi-
270catesthat thereweredifferent junctures in timewherearenegotiation
of the power balance between state and church were possible and,
indeed, had taken place. Notably Anderson, as well as Kahl, has dis-
cussed how the Church in Sweden changed its position and strategies
in relation to the changing social and political environment47—and
275so, of course, did other political actors. The following study demon-
strates that it was the changing cleavage structure, and the new cross-
cutting lines between class and religion in particular, that formed a
dynamic political field in the early twentieth century, creating
overlap of interests and positions between political parties as well
280as contention within parties.48 Analyzing this interplay between
actors helps explain why there was not more outright conflict
between SAP, when in government, and the Church. In short, a path
42. The political field was quite dynamic in the first decades of the twentieth
century with many political parties experiencing splits and new formations in
this period. See Yvonne Hirdmann, Urban Lundberg, and Jenny Bjo¨rkman, Sver-
iges Historia 1920-1965 (Stockholm: Norstedts Fo¨rlag, 2012), 122ff.
43. Klas A˚mark, Hundra a˚r av va¨lfa¨rdspolitik. Va¨lfa¨rdsstatens framva¨xt i Norge
och Sverige (Umea˚: Borea, 2005); Olsson, Social Policy.
44. Ekstro¨m, Makten o¨ver kyrkan.
45. See, e.g., Ho¨jer, Svensk Socialpolitisk historia, 52.
46. The reformation in the Rokkanian account; the mid-nineteenth century for
Kaspersen and Lindvall, and the early twentieth century in Anderson’s case, see
Flora “State Formation”; Kaspersen and Lindvall, “Why No Religious”; Anderson,
“The Church as Nation.”
47. Anderson, “The Church as Nation”; Sigrun Kahl, “Religious Doctrines and
Poor Relief: A Different Causal Pathway,” in Religion, Class Coalitions, and
WelfareStates, ed.PhilipManowandKeesvanKersbergen (Cambridge:Cambridge
University Press, 2009), 267-96.
48. See for a fuller discussion Ingela Naumann, “Childcare Politics in the ‘New’
Welfare State: Class, Religion, and Gender in the Shaping of Political Agendas,”
in The Politics of the New Welfare State, ed. Giuliano Bonoli and David Natali
(Oxford; Oxford University Press, 2012), 158-81.
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of compromise and conflict avoidance thathas become characteristic
of Swedish political culture was followed.49
285Political Constellations and Crosscutting Cleavages in
the Early Twentieth Century
Ithas frequentlybeenpointedout that thesuccessofSAP increatinga
“Social Democratic welfare state” not only rested on labor movement
strength (and the connection between SAP and the trade unions), but
290on SAP’s ability to forge cross-class alliances: first with the farmers in
the 1930s, then with the middle classes later on in the 1950s and
1960s.50 It is less often discussed in what ways the link between the
Swedish labor movement with other popular movements shaped
SAP’s relationship and approach to religion. This section looks at
295the way class and religious cleavages cut across party lines in the
early twentieth century, analyzing how they created tensions and
conflict as well as opening space for the formulation of shared polit-
ical narratives and compromises.
In Sweden, industrialization started late in the second half of the
300nineteenth century but then took off with great intensity. Economic
change led to considerable uprooting of traditional agrarian com-
munities and intensified the misery of vast parts of the already
poor Swedish population. The young and healthy left the villages in
great numbers and headed to the cities or across the sea. Between
3051851 and 1930 approximately 1.4 million people emigrated from
Sweden to the United States, a substantial loss of population consid-
ering that the population of Sweden in 1900 was only 5.1 million.51
These great transformations and the concomitant social problems
they created triggered the mobilization of a series of social move-
310ments, theso-calledpopularmovements: the temperancemovement,
religious freethinkers, feminists, consumer cooperatives, and the
workers’ movement.52 What united all of the popular movements
was their protest against the “old regime”—the rigid and conserva-
tive, preindustrial, and premodern social order upheld by the
49. DanwartA.Rustow,ThePoliticsofCompromise:AStudyofPartiesandCabinet
Government in Sweden (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955); Go¨ran
Rosenberg, “The Crisis of Consensus in Postwar Sweden,” in Culture and Crisis:
The Case of Germany and Sweden, ed. Nina Witoszek and Lars Tra¨ga˚rdh
(New York/Oslo: Berghahn Books, 2002), 170-201.
50. Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds; Peter Baldwin, The Politics of Social Solid-
arity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
51. Lena Sommestad, “Welfare State Attitudes to the Male Breadwinning System:
The United States and Sweden in Comparative Perspective,” in: Angelique Jans-
sens, ed., The Rise and Decline of the Male Breadwinning Family? (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 153-74.
52. Olsson, Social Policy, 47.
Consensus, Conflict, or Compromise? Q2
11
315nobility, the bourgeoisie, and an orthodox state church; a deep
concern with the social and spiritual conditions of human life; a striv-
ing for equality, solidarity, and justice; and the demand for greater
democratization of society.53
Religious revivalism was the first of the popular movements to
320emerge and was in many ways influenced by the Pietism of the eight-
eenth century. Pietism emphasized the Protestant concept of a
“priesthood of all believers,” and in its radical form maintained that
“there was no authority except from God,” thus challenging the
Lutheran social order and its hierarchies. It was predominantly lay-
325people who were active in the free churches of the nineteenth
century, challenging both the hierarchies of the Lutheran Church as
well as the political order of traditional society with its estates. Reli-
gious revivalism, therefore, not only led to claims for religious
freedom but also demands for political freedom such as the right to
330assembly.54 The Swedish Church was, from the outset, hostile
toward Pietists and to the emergence of free churches. According to
Thorkildsen, the Swedish Lutheran Church was a High Church, a con-
servative, orthodox church that did not tolerate individualistic, reviv-
alist tendencies in the parishes.55 Many Lutheran clerics tended to
335align themselves with political conservatism and the attempt to pre-
serve the traditional social order, though some showed more social
interest.56 Nathan So¨derblom, archbishop from 1914, emphasized
that the social question was one of great importance to the Church,
but that it did not naturally stand on the side of a specific political
340party. Rather it was on the side of those in need. There were,
however, also those Lutheran churchmen who specifically supported
the Left.57 Nevertheless, the SwedishChurch’sgenerally conservative
stance fuelled the ongoing alienation of parts of the population from
official Lutheranism, and the Church’s reaction to religious revival-
345ism caused strong polarization between the official state church
and the free churches.58
Politically, religious revivalism was most closely associated with
Liberalism and ideas of building a society on free and liberal founda-
tions. The free churches also fostered religiously motivated social
350activism, and thus presented a conception of the organization of
social welfare on the basis of individual social engagement that was
53. Go¨ran Therborn, “‘Pillarization’ and ‘Popular Movements’: Two Variants of
Welfare State Capitalism: The Netherlands and Sweden,” in The Comparative
Historyof Public Policy, ed. Francis G. Castles (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989), 198.
54. Thorkildsen, “Religious Identity,” 247.
55. Ibid., 147.
56. Tingsten, Den Svenska Socialdemokratiens, 296.
57. Ekstro¨m, Makten o¨ver kyrkan, 22.
58. Thorkildsen, “Religious Identity,” 146.
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both different from Social Democratic and social conservative
visions.59 The free churches attracted upwardly striving social
groups in particular, such as shop clerks and craftsmen, both in
355rural and urban settings, who were important in the formation of a
modern middle class.60 But some revivalist associations, for
example the Salvation Army, were particularly popular with the
urban working class.61
Memberships in the popular mass movements of the late nine-
360teenth and early twentieth century often overlapped, and it has
been emphasized how the cultural environment created by religious
revivalism and temperance organizations, propagating a disciplined
lifestyle of daily work, sobriety, and simplicity, became essential for
labororganizing.62 By the beginning of the twentieth century, around
365a third of Sweden’s population was organized in one or more of the
popular movements, giving them political weight in the nascent
Swedish democracy. But neither religious revivalism nor the temper-
ance movement had the ambition to form a parliamentary party, as
did the labor movement. In the political arena, SAP thus became the
370“main carrier” of the popular movement tradition in Sweden.63 The
first Social Democratic Party leader Hjalmar Branting noted that
SAP was in fact a “people’s party” rather than a class party.64 The
fact that the majority of SAP parliamentarians were teetotalers and
many belonged to free churches illustrates the interconnectedness
375of the popular movements. Also, other political parties could lay
claim to representing the interests of the popular movements: the
Liberal Party even named itself “people’s party” (folkpartiet) in
1934, while the Farmers’ Party (Bondefo¨rbundet, later called Center-
partiet, “partyof thecentre”) also claimed tospeak for “thepeople.”65
380Some scholars have emphasized this link between the popular
movements and various political parties, as well as their coalition
building as the basis for the development of the Swedish welfare
state.66 However, the intersections of social cleavages around class
and religion, as well as the urban and rural sections of the population,
59. Sidenvall, “Frikyrkligheten i Sverige,” 83.
60. Ibid., 84; Thorkildsen, “Religious Identity,” 147.
61. Sidenvall, “Frikyrkligheten i Sverige,” 85.
62. Olsson, Social Policy, 49; Therborn, “Pillarization”; Thorkildsen, “Religious
Identity”; Stra˚th, “Der Volksbegriff in der Organisation.”
63. Therborn, “Pillarization,” 201.
64. BerndHenningsen,DerWohlfahrtsstaatSchweden (Baden-Baden:NomosVer-
lagsgesellschaft, 1986).
65. Today, the Centre Partyand the Liberal Party in Sweden are considered part of
the Right political block together with the other conservative parties. But in the
early twentieth century the Liberals were seen to belong to the political Left
together with the Social Democrats.
66. Therborn, “Pillarization”; Olsson, Social Policy.
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385also caused problems for political parties. This was arguably most
strongly felt among the Liberals, as the free church and temperance
movements effectively split the middle class.67 As a result, in 1923
party-internal conflicts led to the split of the Liberal Party.68 But the
crosscutting lines of religion and class also caused tensions within
390the Social Democratic Party. In its early phases SAP was not only anti-
church but also antireligious.69 The Social Democratic Party program
of 1890 explicitly stated its commitment to abolishing the state
Church system. Q9On the issue of religion in general the program was
more prudent, adopting a neutral position, most likely taking into
395account the sizable following from the free churches. Religion was
to be an exclusively private matter and an individual choice. Still
stronger antireligious attitudes existed in the labor movement: in
1917 the radical left wing of SAP split off, forming the Communist
Party,70 taking with it those most ardently opposed to religion. Yet,
400the Swedish Church and its clergy, with their often authoritarian
demeanor, were seen by many Social Democrats as the class
enemy.71 There were, however, several important Christian politi-
cians active in SAP that would shape the party’s stance toward the
Swedish Church in a way that toned down state-church conflict,
405which created space for compromise.
Within SAP, the crosscutting religious and class affiliations can
perhaps most clearly be represented through the example of two
key figures in the party: leading church politicians Arthur Engberg
and Harald Halle´n. Engberg was one of the leading Social Democratic
410politicians and held a very critical attitude toward the Lutheran
Church. Early on, he ardently promoted the abolition of the state
Church system but would later change his position. However,
Engberg was not necessarily antireligious. As a child, he grew up
under the influence of religious revivalism, his father being a
415Baptist; however, he became influenced by Marxism as a young
man.72 In 1932 Engberg became SAP’s minister of Ecclesiastic
Affairs and is today positively remembered for his passionate
engagement in revising the psalmbook of the Lutheran Church.73 In
short, Engberg had a complicated relationship with the Church. In
420opposition to Engberg on religious questions stood another leading
Social Democrat. Halle´n was a pastor in Arvika and was strongly
67. Stra˚th, “Der Volksbegriff in der Organisation.”
68. In 1934 the different liberal parties were reunited in the Liberal “people’s
party.”
69. Gustafsson, “Church-State Separation,” 53.
70. Stra˚th, Sveriges Historia.
71. Ekstro¨m, Makten o¨ver kyrkan, 32; Claesson, Folkhemmets kyrka, 264.
72. Claesson, Folkhemmets kyrka.
73. Ekstro¨m, Makten o¨ver kyrkan.
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active in the temperance movement. From 1911–1960 Halle´n was a
member of the second chamber of Parliament for SAP. He was a
member of the party’s leadership from 1928–1932, the period
425when the Social Democratic vision of the “people’s home” became
influential in the party. Halle´n promoted the perpetuation of the
state Church system with a vision of transforming the Swedish
Church into a “people’s church” open to all citizens. The term “the
people” was to become a key concept in political discourse in
430Sweden in the 1920s and 1930s, and Halle´n’s idea of a democratic
people’s church would help integrate the Swedish Church into the
Social Democratic vision of modern Swedish society as a “people’s
home.”
From Popular Movements to “People’s Home” and
435“People’s Church”
Bo Stra˚th has emphasized the symbolic importance of the term folk,
meaning “the people,” in the Swedish political discourse of the early
twentieth century and its part in creating a national identity and
linking agrarian society with modern society. Folk, as it came to be
440understood inSweden,hadmany layersofoscillatingmeaning,point-
ing to the preservation of a national cultural heritage while also
including the concept of a progressive, forward-looking nation. The
term received political meaning, in the way the mass “popular move-
ments” claimed to represent the Swedish “people,” and it also had
445strong religious connotations.74
During the 1920s SAP was effective in integrating the “people”
concept into its social policy agenda by coining the metaphor of the
Swedish“people’shome” (folkhem). Inafamousspeech beforeParlia-
ment in 1928, party leader Per Albin Hansson outlined his vision of a
450future egalitarian welfare state, explaining that it was to be guided by
thesame values and principles as agoodfamily home: equality, solid-
arity, cooperation, and helpfulness. No onewas privileged oroutcast,
oppressed or exploited.75
Byusing themetaphorof thePeople’s Home Q10for itsvisionofmodern
455society, the Social Democrats demonstrated two things. First, it
marked a turning away from a revolutionary, Marxist discourse
toward social reformism. It was a shift from the class struggle and
work/capital antagonism toward “family” and “home,” places—at
74. Stra˚th, “NordicCapitalismandDemocratization”; Stra˚th, “DerVolksbegriff in
der Organisation.”
75. PerAlbin Hansson’s famousspeechof 1928hasbeen recounted bynumerous
scholarly narrations of Sweden’s recent history. See, for example, Hugh Heclo and
Henrik J. Madsen, Policy and Politics in Sweden: Principled Pragmatism (Philadel-
phia: Temple University Press, 1987); Hirdmann, Sveriges Historia, 150.
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least symbolically—of harmony and cooperation, discursive
460domains traditionally occupied by conservative political forces.76
Secondly, theusageof thephrase “SwedishPeople’sHome” enhanced
theSAP’sclaimtobea“people’sparty,” the truerepresentativesof the
Swedish people, not just the working class.
However, at the beginning of the twentieth century the “folk” term
465was not necessarily a Left concept; there were many interest groups
in Swedish society that lay claim to this term. In 1906 agrarian minis-
ter and farmer Alfred Petterson used for the first time the phrase
“people’s home.” In 1912 the Uppsala professor and “young conser-
vative” Rudolf Kje´llen more explicitly developed a conservative
470concept of a “People’s Home.” Kje´llen much admired Wilhelmine (Bis-
marckian) Germany and took inspiration from the German “Volk” for
his concept of a Swedish “folk hem.” Kje´llen conceptualized the
People’s Home as a national and social conservative reform model
and as a response to the class struggle discourse of the labor move-
475ment.77 The proposed reforms included “welfare for all” and active
population policy as an instrument for social peace and as a means
to stop emigration. Thus, the folkhem as a symbol and reform
project for a happy, Swedish national community was at first the con-
servatives’ reaction to the threat posed by the popular movements. It
480was the National Conservatives’ acknowledgement that the “old
regime” of the Swedish empire had had its day, and that in the face
ofgreatsocialandeconomic transformations,a renewalandreforma-
tionof theoldsystemwasneeded.The folkhemwasat firstanattempt
to reform society along conservative and traditional premises.78
485During the first few decades of the twentieth century, the conserva-
tives and the Social Democrats competed over who were the true rep-
resentatives of the Swedish “folk” and whose social reform programs
would be the most viable to solve the nation’s social problems. The
Social Democrats emerged as victors of this contest; from the
4901930s onwards, the People’s Home became the image for the Social
Democratic welfare state.79
76. Yvonne Hirdman, Att la¨gga livet till ra¨tta – studier i svensk folkhemspolitik
(Stockholm: Carlssons, 1989), 92; Valeska Henze, Das schwedische Volksheim.
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Thefolk conceptwasalsoembracedwithin the ranksof theSwedish
Church. A group of mainly young Lutheran theologians (for example
Sundstro¨m, Billing, Bjo¨rkquivst, and later Runestam, Aule´n, and
495Nyberg), the so-called young churchmen (ungkyrkoma¨n), used the
term—in line with Kjellen’s nationalist-conservative ideas—as a
description of their Christian-national vision of society.80 Using the
slogan “The Swedish People, God’s People,” they propagated church
reforms that would turn the Swedish Church into a “people’s
500church,” a church that was closer to the people and actively
engaged with modern developments and new needs arising from
societal transformations.
Under the pressure of criticism by the free churches, as well as the
continued secularization process in society, the folk church concept
505was the Swedish Church’s attempt to find a new, theologically
grounded identity that would restore its moral authority and offer
an alternative to the class language in relation to the social ques-
tion.81 “The folk church concept was a conscious theological model
for a Church meeting modern society.”82
510A characteristic of the Swedish theological discourse of the time
was its emphasis on the practical implications that sprang from
Lutheran ethical principles. Selfless “love-action” or service to
others always had to be materialized and situated in concrete
action. Another important aspect of Lutheran ethics in the Swedish
515tradition was the contention that a social and legal order was never
identical with the divine order. Thus, changing an existing social
order might even be a Christian obligation. It is important to note,
then, that Swedish Lutheran theology did not oppose state involve-
ment in social welfare. To the contrary, from a Lutheran ethical per-
520spective, social reforms that fought against economic inhumanity
caused by capitalist profit maximization were seen as society’s obli-
gation,83 and it was welcomed from a Lutheran perspective if the
state took on this responsibility. However, this interpretation of
Lutheran ethics also provided an opportunity fora more activist Prot-
525estantism, laying out a Christian foundation for social reform that
could serve as inspiration for philanthropic reform projects and
give the Swedish Church a theological legitimization for its increased
Construction of Class Identities: The Struggle for Discursive Power in Social Organ-
isation: Scandinavia and Germany after 1800 (Gothenburgh: Gothenburg Univer-
sity, 1990).
80. Thidevall, Ett folkkyrkligt reformprograms, 49.
81. Gustafsson, “Church-State Separation,” 54; Stra˚th, “Der Volksbegriff in der
Organisation.”
82. Thidevall, Ett folkkyrkligt reformprograms, 303.
83. Gustaf Aule´n, Kann na˚got kristet krav sta¨llas pa˚ staten? (Stockholm, 1940).
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engagement in society and politics. The diverse field of religiously
motivated social welfare initiatives, instigated by the deaconry, indi-
530viduals, andreligiouslyoriented organizations during the nineteenth
century, grew during the first half of the twentieth century.84
The “Truce” Between State and Church in the
Interwar Years
At the turnof thecentury, acertain easing of the tensions between the
535Church and Social Democracy took place; the Church started to open
up toward social changes and developed a new understanding of its
role and place in modern society, and SAP began to tone down its ani-
mosity toward the Church. Yet during World War I the cleavage
between the Church and SAP deepened again. Fueled by growing
540nationalism and pressing social challenges, deep demarcation lines
opened in society between a conservative bloc, prioritizing defense
expenses, and a social liberal/labor bloc, pushing for social reform.
Many clerics of the Swedish Church had openly supported the
“farmers’ march” of 1914 that organized 30,000 farmers in protest
545against the Social Liberal???? government Q11and tried to assert the
authority of the king. It was countered by a workers’ march, mobiliz-
ing 50,000 workers to demonstrate popular resistance against a “for-
tified poor house.”85 In this situation, the Swedish Church became
visible as a force that attempted to thwart attempts to modernize
550and democratize society.
In 1917 SAP took up government for the first time in coalition with
the Liberals, and in the following year put a series of motions before
Parliament aimed at diminishing the Church’s role in society,
demanding the abolition of the state-church system, separation of
555education from religion, and religious freedom. The motions were
blocked, however, by the first chamber??? Upper house???. Q11In 1920
SAP’s party congress reinforced demands for a separation of state
and church in the new party program.86 Engberg was a leading force
behind these initiatives; arguing from a Marxist perspective, he
560declared the Swedish Church to be, in fact, the church of the ruling
class, and contended that if the ruling class defended the state-
church system, they only did so out of moral self-defense.87
84. Leis, Den kyrkliga diakonins roll; Elisabeth Christiansson, Kyrklig och social
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87. Lennart Tegborg and Urban Claesson, “Arthur Engbergs statskyrka – Harald
Halle´ns folkkyrka. Tva˚ linjer inom svensksocialdemokrati,” Tro &Tanke 7 (1996):
21-43.
Journal of Church and State
18
However, during the same party congress, Halle´n produced an
“opinion statement insupportof religiousvalues” signedbyaconsid-
565erable number of congress members. Halle´n strongly advocated
maintaining the state-church system but suggested a new interpreta-
tion of its role in society: according to Halle´n, there existed an enlight-
ened“folk-Christianity” in theSwedishpopulation,but their religious
orientations and needs had changed in line with societal transforma-
570tions. The Swedish Church needed to be open to these developments;
it should embrace the ideals of social justice and love, emphasized by
the popular movements, as foundations of the Church’s message and
become a democratic “people’s church” open to all Swedish citizens.
TheQ12 religiosity of the Swedish people expressed in the national
575“People’s Church” was, according to Halle´n, a necessary idealistic
foundation for democracy and the Swedish “People’s Home.”88
Halle´n thusposedthe“people” conceptagainstEngberg’s classper-
spective. Engberg received strong support within SAP in 1920;
however, as the party began to move away from its class discourse
580in favor of a more moderate position as a “people’s party,” Halle´n’s
idea of the Church as an inclusive “people’s church” started to reso-
nate and by the end of the 1920s had become an accepted Social Dem-
ocratic concept. A reorientation toward religion and the state-church
issue took place within the Social Democratic camp, and the focus on
585the state-church question started to give way to other, more pressing
issues. The more conciliatory stance in SAP was, however, not only a
result of its general ideological moderation, but also a tactical ploy.
The leadership of the SAP realized that an overly antireligious
stance might make party members resign or deter new members
590from joining the party, as large parts of the SAP’s constituency were
deeply immersed in thecultural climateof religiousPietism.TheProt-
estant heritage was thus something the SAP could not easily ignore.
In addition, leading Social Democrats recognized the opportunities
that went along with a state Church system: as long as the Church was
595linked to the state, the state could exert powerover it. After having led
the Social Democratic campaign for separation of state and church it
was, somewhat surprisingly, Engberg who, after 1920, forcefully pro-
moted the preservation of the state Church system. Engberg now
began to promote the view that “the care of religion” should not be
600left entirely outside the control of the state. Rather than weakening
the influence of the state on religious matters, it should be strength-
ened.89 To Engberg, the Swedish Church ought to be another branch
of the state’s functions, such as the military or education; its remit
should be spiritual welfare only, while social welfare was to be
88. Claesson, Folkhemmets kyrka, 273.
89. Gustafsson, “Church-State Separation,” 54.
Consensus, Conflict, or Compromise? Q2
19
605delivered by the state.90 This new, functional interpretation of the
state-church relationship was also triggered by economic interest. If
the state Church was but an administrative branch of the state, then
the Church’s lands and properties did not really belong to the
Church but to the state: the Church was just the steward of these
610goods and lands.91
Churchrepresentatives,observingthenewtrends in theSAPtoward
the Swedish Church, feared such a development. They were quick to
realize that the Swedish Church under a Social Democratic govern-
ment would become merely an agency of the state.92 Within the
615Swedish Church, debates ensued over the governance structure of
the Church and a demand was voiced, particularly from the folk
church wing, for a separation of the Church and the state. In 1929
the Swedish bishops made a historic joint proposal before the
Swedish General Synod for state-church reform.93 Their proposal
620would bring greater independence to the Church vis-a`-vis the state,
while also integrating the modern associational forms of social serv-
ices provision that had developed since the mid-nineteenth century
into the legal structure of the Church.94 The bishops’ argument for
a greater separation of state and church was that, in the face of past
625developments (secularization and free church movement), the
people who belonged to the state and those who adhered to the
Church were not identical anymore.95 The bishops further grounded
their proposals with reference to the folk church concept, with the
aim of seeking greater closeness to the people and greater distance
630from state power. The General Synod then made a request to the
Swedish government for a government investigation into how to
reform the state-church system along these lines.
This investigation was never undertaken. The Social Democrats,
dominating the political scene, did not let the Church off the hook
635so easily; rather, they strengthened their grip around it by making
Engberg minister of Ecclesiastic Affairs in 1932. Engberg rejected
the Swedish Church’s demands for separation from the state,
90. Tegborg and Claesson, “Arthur Engberg’s statskyrka.”
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precisely by referring to the folk church concept. He argued that the
state church as a national church encompassed the whole people in
640an integrative, indiscriminate manner; therefore, the state church
was in effect the true “people’s church.”96
There was, however, a short political interlude with a Liberal gov-
ernment from 1930–1932 that allowed the Swedish Church some
maneuvering with respect to governance structures. The Liberals
645were not wedded to Engberg’s ideas about the state church. And
when the reform plans of the Swedish Church for more independ-
ence failed, the dominant strategy within the Swedish Church
became to preserve its traditional structures and strengthen the
communal character of the parishes, meaning it came to focus on
650the medieval countryside parishes rather than on the growing
urban areas. This line of action was also politically supported; in
1932 the Swedish Parliament decided on a reform to decentralize
church finances, which increased the decision-making power of
the local parishes and gave them the right to receive and dispose
655of revenue.97 The preservation strategy of the Swedish Church
thus showed immediate success in gaining greater financial inde-
pendence in its parishes. It was, however, a victory for those who
wished to preserve the old church structures and a blow to the
folk church wing that sought greater engagement with modern
660society.98 With hindsight, it seems clear that this strategic choice
of the Swedish Church was more detrimental than beneficial to its
position in society.
After 1932, there was little development in the state-church ques-
tion. When SAP came back into power, they had other priorities, and
665thefocusonthe localparishesalignedwellwith theSocialDemocrats’
ideas about religion and the role of the Church. In Social Democratic
imagery the state Church as a “people’s church” was constructed as
the bearer of a cultural heritage at the local parish level. The
Swedish Church, as the steward of local traditional parish culture,
670constituted a link between theSwedishagrarianpastand the progres-
sive future; the “People’s Church” was another way to reach out to the
whole population in their individual religious practices, to link the
people to the state—the People’s Home.99 But the transformation of
the Lutheran state church into a “people’s church” under Social Dem-
675ocratic rule began a secularization process of the Church itself. The
Churchaccrued folkloristic elements asthebearerof apositively con-
noted cultural heritage. Protestantism in this process became
96. Thidevall, Ett folkkyrkligt reformprograms, 292.
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increasingly a “cultural religion”—central in terms of Swedish
peoples’ national identity but largely emptied of its religious
680meaning and practices.100
The new “working relation” that had been established between the
“Social Democratic state” and the Swedish Lutheran Church by the
1930s meant that the Church received more autonomy in some
areas (the parishes) but that its role was reduced in others (social
685welfare); the state Church system was maintained, but the Church
was to be inclusive and more democratically organized as a
“people’s church.” Halle´n’s “people’s church” concept symbolically
created an important bridge between different wings within SAP,
making the state-church system more palatable to those who had
690been critical of it while protecting the religious sensibilities of
others. It also helped in the longer run to diffuse political conflict
with the Conservatives and Farmers’ parties, who had been
opposed to the abolition of the state-church system.
The state-church question remained unresolved on the political
695agenda, but the economic crisis of the 1930s and the outbreak of
World War II meant that the question slid down the political priority
list. Once a “truce” had been established with the Church, the Social
Democrats along with conservative governments, adapted a strategy
of “conflict-avoidance” with respect to religion. In 1951 an act estab-
700lishing full religious freedom passed Parliament without much con-
tention, but the state-church question had to wait until 1958 when
an official state commission was charged with looking into different
reform options. They Q13presented their lengthy conclusions in 1968,
but their suggestions did not lead to any political decisions, and
705another investigation followed later in 1968 with results in 1972.
Yetagain, the issueswereput torestwhen itbecameclear that thereli-
gious cleavage still cut across political party lines, and the state-
church question might risk affecting the parliamentary elections of
1973. It would, in fact, take until the turn of the next century when,
710finally in 2000 and on the basis of a broad societal consensus, the
Church was officially separated from the state101 at a time when the
relation of most Swedish citizens to religion was radically different
from the early twentieth century. By now Sweden had, indeed,
become a thoroughly secularized and, in the wake of immigration,
715religiously plural country. The state-church system was now gener-
ally perceived as anachronistic.
100. Nicholas Jay Demerath, “The Rise of ‘Cultural Religion’ in European Christi-
anity: Learning from Poland, Northern Ireland, and Sweden,” Social Compass 47
(2000): 127-39.
101. Gustafsson, “Church-State Separation.”
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Concluding Remarks
Does this account of Swedish state-church relations in the early twen-
tieth century put into question the common characterization of the
720Swedish welfare state as a Social Democratic welfare state? No, it
does not contradict general notions of the primacy of public
welfare provision and of the dominance of Social Democracy in
shaping this type of welfare state. But this article challenges simplis-
tic assumptions about the cleavage structure and political constella-
725tionsthat ledto thisoutcome. Inparticular, itdemonstrateshowclass
conflict was overlaid with religious conflict in the formation of the
political parties in Sweden, creating overlapping claims, positions,
and ideologies between political parties, as well as tensions and con-
tradictions within them. The question of the role of the Church was
730integral to the competing political visions of modern Swedish
society in this period. And due to the historic strong ties of the
Church with the state, the governance of the Church itself became a
central point of conflict.
The Swedish Church and SAP were in many ways antagonists in the
735political struggles of the early twentieth century and strong tensions
arose when SAP came into power. As a state church the Lutheran
Church had been a powerful institution in Swedish society for hun-
dredsofyears,but itsclose linkswiththestatealsomade itvulnerable
to changes in the political power balance. When SAP attempted Q14to
740integrate the state church as a “de-christianized” functional branch
of thestate (aspromotedbyEngberg), theSwedishbishopsattempted
to separate the Church from the state.
In this highly contentious situation a compromise was found: while
the Church received greater autonomy with respect to local parishes,
745it was clarified that social welfare was the state´s responsibility.102
Had the Swedish Church succeeded in separating from the state,
opening the possibility for a more activist organized Christian
social engagement, we can imagine a counterfactual situation
where the state might have had to share the field of social welfare pro-
750vision with the Church.
An important symbolic construction that helped bridge opposing
positions in the state-church question was the theologically
grounded concept of the “People’s Church” as developed by SAP pol-
itician and pastor Harald Halle´n. It helped reconcile the more radical
755stance amongst SAP’s leadership with the religious beliefs of the
majority of the Swedish people. Tying the Swedish Church via the
102. Nevertheless, as Leis demonstrates in this volume, there would remain in
practice considerable overlap of activity between the state and religiously based
organizations with respect to social welfare provision long into the second half
of the twentieth century.
Consensus, Conflict, or Compromise? Q2
23
people church concept to the Social Democratic “People’s Home”
made Protestantism part of the image of a politically progressive
Social Democratic welfare state.
760In conclusion, “consensus” is not a very useful concept for under-
standing state-church relations in Sweden in the early twentieth
century. Rather, it is the forging of compromise that characterized
the religious politics of the time, a compromise that was necessitated
as well as facilitated by the multiple class and religious affiliations of
765politiciansandchurchmenalike, andthatcutacrossparty lines. Ithas
been emphasized that the successful creation of alliances and com-
promises across social cleavages laid the basis for the postwar
welfare state in Sweden. The renegotiation of state-church relations
discussed in this article should be regarded as one of these core polit-
770ical settlements of modern Swedish society.
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